abstract: ABSTRACT In this work, I provide two novel pieces of evidence in favor of the view that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. First, I present an empirical case via the results of a series of recent experiments to show that folk-knowledge attributions may be sensitive to time constraints even when the latter are construed in a non-truth relevant manner. Along the way, I consider some comments made by Jonathan Schaffer (2006) as it pertains to interpreting time constraints-sensitivity in a manner that supports contextualism, before offering reasons to resist such a treatment. I proceed by applying interest relative invariantism to adjudicate a conflict in the epistemology of testimony namely, the positive reasons requirement a la, reductionism vs. non-reductionism. In particular, I highlight how whether an epistemic subject H needs positive non-testimonial reasons to be justified in accepting S's testimony that p, depends on what is at stake for H in believing that p and how much time H has in deliberating about p. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Philosophy 2013
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:18078 |
Date | January 2013 |
Contributors | Shin, Joseph Ellis (Author), Pinillos, N. Angel (Advisor), Reynolds, Steven L (Committee member), White, Michael J (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
Source Sets | Arizona State University |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Masters Thesis |
Format | 84 pages |
Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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