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Is historic Christian opposition to feticide intellectually defensible in the 21st century?

In this work, I argue that the Alexandiran position on feticide found in Hellenistic Judaism and appropriated by patristic, medieval and reformed theologians is defensible in the 21st Century. I formulate an argument from the Alexandrian position as it appears in several representative Christian traditions. This argument contends that that: [1] killing a human being without justification violates the law of God, [2] a formed conceptus (i.e. a fetus) is a human being and [3] that in the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) no justification is forthcoming.
In developing my case, I argue that the objections raised against the premises of this argument by contemporary philosphers are unsound. I defend the intellectual acceptability of belief in and appeals to the existence of a divine law, the notion that a formed fetus is a human being and the claim that feticide lacks any justification in the vast majority of cases.
In addition, I examine and critique theologians who claim the Alexandrian position is motivated by misogyny and those who claim it appropriates a translation error found in the Septuagint.
I conclude that the traditional position is defensible and that contemporary dismissals of it are unconvincing.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/217461
Date January 2006
CreatorsFlannagan, Matthew, n/a
PublisherUniversity of Otago. Department of Theology and Religious Studies
Source SetsAustraliasian Digital Theses Program
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Rightshttp://policy01.otago.ac.nz/policies/FMPro?-db=policies.fm&-format=viewpolicy.html&-lay=viewpolicy&-sortfield=Title&Type=Academic&-recid=33025&-find), Copyright Matthew Flannagan

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