1 SUMMARY In general this thesis deals with the question whether or to what extent human thinking is rational in terms of the optimality of the way people achieve their goals and in terms of the consistency between people's beliefs and the structure of the world. This question is quite difficult to answer unequivocally because the answer will always depend on the nature of the particular task and the exact way in which we define rationality. Among other things, that's the reason why we can meet two contradictory schools of thought within the so-called Great Rationality Debate, one of which is convinced of the systematic irrationality of human thinking (in the sense of the systematic deviation of human thinking from normative predictions stemming from the principles of rational thinking as they are captured by the statistical theory of probability, formal logic or decision theory), while the other one considers human thought to be more or less rational, and finds the source of its (alleged) failure elsewhere. In the case of the latter, however, the question is how to explain the apparent existence of irrational behavior and interindividual differences in such behavior. One possible answer to this question is illustrated by Griffiths and Tenenbaum's Bayesian model of causal reasoning based on perceived...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:373815 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Stehlík, Luděk |
| Contributors | Bahbouh, Radvan, Buriánek, Jiří, Lukavský, Jiří |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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