In this thesis, I explore moral intuition as an epistemological tool for constructing moral systems, focusing specifically on the challenges arising from evolutionary and cultural biases. This thesis will consider and discuss Michael Huemer's Ethical Intuitionism, Peter Singer's critique of moral intuitions, and Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma, I consider some possible defenses and counterarguments concerning the reliability of moral intuitions. Furthermore, this thesis examines the potential self-defeating nature of certain arguments against the reliability of moral intuitions, while concurrently discussing the broader implications of these criticisms on other areas of philosophy and the potential ramifications on our other cognitive faculties, such as logic and rationality. Alternative perspectives are briefly considered by presenting the approaches to morality of Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. Marx's theory of historical materialism and Nietzsche's concept of Will to Power. Presenting their interpretations of moral evolution, these offer contrasts to the debate surrounding moral intuitions. Ultimately, this thesis proposes that we are either compelled to accept moral intuitions as a reliable epistemological tool to construct moral systems or embrace global skepticism because of the biases and limitations inherent in our cognitive faculties. I will explore what I propose is the paradoxical nature of moral intuitions as an epistemological tool and their role in our pursuit of moral truth.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-210072 |
| Date | January 2023 |
| Creators | Frost, Pontus |
| Publisher | Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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