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A note on unionized firms' incentive to integrate vertically

In this paper I analyze a vertically structured monopolized market with unionized firms. I compare two types of contracts: vertical integration and franchising. With franchising and wage bargaining at the firm level the union in the downstream firm is either very powerful or has no bargaining power at all, depending on the specific time structure of the model. These arguments could make integration preferable for the profit owners even if integration is accompanied by small transaction costs. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:epub-wu-01_151
Date January 2000
CreatorsGrandner, Thomas
PublisherInst. fĂĽr Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
Source SetsWirtschaftsuniversität Wien
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypePaper, NonPeerReviewed
Formatapplication/pdf
Relationhttp://epub.wu.ac.at/1276/

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