We experimentally study the effects of allotment - the division of an item into homogeneous units - in independent private value auctions. We compare a single-item, first-price auction with two equivalent treatments with allotment: a two-unit discriminatory auction and two simultaneous single-unit first-price auctions. We find that allotment mitigates overbidding, with this effect being stronger in the discriminatory auction. In the allotment treatments, we observe large and persistent bid spreading. Across treatments, the discriminatory auction is the least efficient and generates the lowest revenue.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:5755 |
| Date | 23 March 2016 |
| Creators | Corazzini, Luca, Galavotti, Stefano, Sausgruber, Rupert, Valbonesi, Paola |
| Publisher | Springer US and the Economic Science Association |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Relation | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-016-9476-1, https://link.springer.com/journal/10683, https://www.springer.com/de/open-access/authors-rights/self-archiving-policy/2124, http://epub.wu.ac.at/5755/ |
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