China is a modernizing agrarian society. As such, it
pursued certain goals within an environment of resource scarcity.
This research analyzes Chinese public policies for agrarian development
within a framework of political economy. It begins with the
hypothesis that resources, (material output, infrastructure,
political legitimacy, etc.), can be politicized such that their values
becane relative within a single costs/benefits framework". The exchange
of resources between the regime and social sectors is reflected in
public policy.
The hypothesis is tested in a longitudinal case study of
Chinese agrarian policies, extending from 1949 through 1964. During
this period, Chinese decision makers focused on the agrarian sector
and its role in the attainment of national goals. Therefore, within
this time frame, the dynamics of resource creation, investment and
exchange can be traced through the agrarian policy matrix to demonstrate
the utility of this model.
When resources are politicized they are brought into a
"political market" where they become available for use. The first
step toward the creation of this market is the politicization of
existing resources. In China, this was effected by land reform and
by the creation of infrastructure to penetrate and control the rural
marketplace itself.
As the political market expands, it also becomes more complex,
generating greater demands for all types of resources. Chinese collectivization
policies reorganized the internal resources of the agrarian
sector -- land and labor -- in order to increase their productivity.
However, internal resources proved insufficient for agrarian modernization
and the collective infrastructure proved costly in terms of
political and social resources. Therefore, communization was adopted
as an alternative pattern of resource use and investment.
The size, functional scope and structural efficiency of the
commune were designed to maximize the use-value of internal agrarian
resources. But its high risk component was the introduction of a
division of labor into the rural environment. Differentiation and
specialization in the production process would destroy traditional
socio-economic units which were functionally integrated. In terms of
the political market, these policies would secure and control the
availability and value of agrarian resources.
The immediate costs of rapid, qualitative change quickly
surpassed long-term benefits. During' the crisis period of 1959-1961,
the division of labor was withdrawn, along with all but the, administrative functions of the commune. However, political inflation,
followed by a drastic deflation, resulted in the collapse of the
political market. Still seeking workable alternatives for resource
utilization, the regime combined agrarian "self-reliance" with
selective technological and capital investments. This strategy
promised differentiated development within the sector and a perpetual
rural/urban dichotomy. As such, it was opposed by the "Maoist"
faction. Reconsolidation policies -- rebuilding the political
market -- became infused with an ideological debate. Out of this
struggle there emerged a workable and essentially Maoist approach --
the Dazhai model -- which created a supportive environment for long term
agrarian development.
The political economy of agrarian development energes when
these policies are viewed within a single costs/benefits framework.
Long range goals were held constant by ideology while intermediate
aims were pursued by evaluating and exchanging resources, and by
choosing among options for resource utilization and investment. The
agrarian policy matrix between 1949 and 1964 thus emerges as complex
and non-linear. But it is developmental, in that the aggregate level
of resource availability and political productivity was increased.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bu.edu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/42000 |
| Date | January 1978 |
| Creators | Bain, Agnes Sapienza |
| Publisher | Boston University |
| Source Sets | Boston University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis/Dissertation |
| Rights | This work is being made available in OpenBU by permission of its author, and is available for research purposes only. All rights are reserved to the author. |
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