Based on current results produced in modern cognitive linguistics this study examines linguistic evidence derived from the experiential field ,labor4 in German and Swedish in order to formulate a theory which more closely describes the relationship between semantic and conceptual structure in lexical concepts. The author maintains that semantic information can be seen as the content of the culture which it reflects and that semantic content is represented in culture specific modes. On the basis of frequency lists a chronologically organized cultural lexicon is presented for each language and culture area. The aim of the cultural lexicon is to point out central fields of concern in the two examined language communities at different times. The second part of the investigation deals with the conceptual structure in two culturally relevant types, labor and unemployment, of the cultural lexicon. In accordance with modern relativist views it is argued that linguistic form must be seen as a result of cultural embodiment and that modes of representation in the human mind must also show traces of this embodiment. It is shown that conceptual (and semantic) structures not only reinforce views of the world, but also play a central role in compatibility restrictions on the performance level. The author suggests that semantic and conceptual structures in lexical concepts are distributed in a metaphorical profile specific to each lexical concept and held together on its various levels by so called protosemes and concernes.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-60868 |
| Date | January 1999 |
| Creators | Brundin, Gudrun |
| Publisher | Umeå universitet, Moderna språk, Umeå : Institutionen för moderna språk, Umeå universitet |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | German |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral thesis, monograph, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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