The work of Martin Heidegger holds a pre-eminent place in contemporary ontological metaphysics, and this, it is argued, is a deeply two-edged sword. Proceeding on the basis of the unity of Heideggers life-long project, the thesis critically evaluates Heideggerian thought, with a particular emphasis on its early formative texts (1923-35), highlighting what are seen as both its radical insights and its important shortcomings. The essay essentially follows Heideggers own philosophical practice in two senses. First, it takes a strongly historical approach both to the etymology and semantics of the language of ontology, as well as to the context of Heideggerian thought in the tradition of western metaphysics. Second, beyond the method of immanent critique alone, it adopts a version of Heideggers own methodology of retrieval (Wiederholung) in its confrontation with his thought: on one hand affirming the radically insightful nature of key elements of his work, while on the other hand looking to bring out of Heideggers (and his precursors) own texts something of their drawing back from the deepest latent implications of his (and their) own insights. The essay begins with a historico-linguistic survey of the language of western ontology, from its origins in ancient Greek and Hellenistic metaphysics, through to its reception into medieval Latin, and onto its deployment in contemporary German and English, in this way establishing a key aspect of the pre-history of the ontological difference in terms of infinitival-participial renderings of the question. The interpretation offered here is then contrasted with key elements of Heideggers own reading of the ancient origins of the tradition, and thus the first major strand of the essays critique of Heideggerian thought is established along both linguistic and conceptual lines: i.e., that is amounts to an einaiolisation of the broad question of ontology. On the basis on this critique, the essay then sets out the understanding of be ειναι, esse, Sein) to be defended in what follows, a reading that situates itself between the Heideggerian and Thomistic positions, affirming and opposing key elements of each. On one hand, the vast wealth of Heideggers alethiological phenomenology of world is affirmed as a radical advance on traditional static notions of essence, while on the other hand the collapse of any genuine understanding of the depth dimension of to exist (υπαρχειν, ex(s)istere) is identified as a major point of contention with Heideggers einaiology. In this way, the second major strand of the essays critique of Heideggerian thought is established: i.e., that it amounts to a partialising alethiolisation of ontology. Within the context provided by the essay to this point, a more explicit retrieval of Heideggerian thought is then enacted first of all by situating his thought within the broad transcendental-phenomenological tradition in which it is so deeply embedded. In particular, this entails close readings of the methodological exclusion (εποχη) of exist(ence) seen in texts by Kant and Husserl, a strategy that in both cases is inadequately ameliorated by allusions to that which is surplus (Überschuß) to predication, meaning, sense, essence. Within the rich context provided by this analysis, the nature of Heideggers innovation within, and yet deep adherence to, the transcendental-phenomenological tradition is sketched. The essays fourth and final chapter involves a detailed confrontation with Heideggers delimitation of the Seinsfrage to alethiological and einaiological concerns alone. This involves a close reading of some major early texts on the question of the independent integrity of beings from world(ing) and thus the meaning of Heideggers category of Vorhandenheit, noting some substantial ambiguities on this question. It also involves a more systematic assessment of the consequential deep inner-contradictions of Heideggers project as a whole, including some reflections on strands of early Heideggerian thought that appear to be attempts to address these deeply embedded tensions and problems. The essays conclusion very briefly links the enacted critique of Heideggerian ontology to the broader question of the understanding of contingency in contemporary continental philosophy, thereby indicating something of the place of these reflections within a larger project of thought concerning philosophy as a hermeneutics of awe for which it serves as an essential prolegomena.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/253076 |
| Creators | Colledge, Richard John David |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Detected Language | English |
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