Corporate governance, and the role of executive pay in particular, has received increased attention from the media, government, and the business arena in recent years. The study reported in this thesis adds to our understanding of both the components and determinants of Australian remuneration packages for the top management team. It does so in four main ways: 1. The study examines the determinants of compensation of a range of senior executives within the organisation, in addition to the CEO. No Australian research, to date, explores the structure and determinants of remuneration beyond the CEO; 2. The research is conducted in a contemporary setting and timeframe, where corporations are subject to expanded disclosure requirements, when compared to the subjects of prior Australian research; 3. It examines an expanded range of factors documented in overseas research as likely to relate to remuneration, some of which have not been previously examined in Australian work; 4. Finally, in developing hypotheses concerning factors expected to relate to remuneration, the study reconciles the perspectives provided by both agency and managerial power theories in terms of how they present similar and differing propositions. The research examines both cash and incentive components of executive compensation disclosed by a sample of top 300 Australian companies in 2005. The model incorporates measures of firm performance, economic characteristics, board monitoring and governance characteristics, and ownership characteristics in an attempt to explain the level of executive compensation. The study extends analysis beyond the CEO to incorporate an investigation of both the structure and determinants of compensation of the top five executives, in addition to the CEO. Results indicate that the structure of CEO compensation has changed since prior Australian research was conducted, to include a more heavy reliance on incentive pay. In contrast to the US, the structure of CEO remuneration differs from that of non-CEO executives. As managers move progressively up the senior executive hierarchy, short-term cash bonus and share-based incentive pay both become more important as components of remuneration. There is also a greater reliance on performance hurdles than has been documented in prior Australian and international research. The expectation that remuneration is now more strongly tied to firm performance is supported. The size and complexity of the firm are also considered to be important in determining the level of various components of both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation. This supports the view that larger, more complex entities attract higher quality executives, and pay for such quality and expertise. Growth firms are more likely to pay higher levels of incentive pay and total compensation to CEOs than non-growth firms. Executive remuneration also relates to the strength of various monitoring and governance mechanisms, although to a greater extent for CEOs than for other senior executives. Managers are able to influence the remuneration-setting process where governance structures are weak, or where they have greater influence. In some cases factors relating to CEO compensation differ from those associated with compensation of lower-level executives.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/210512 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Rankin, Michaela, Michaela.Rankin@buseco.monash.edu.au |
| Publisher | RMIT University. Accounting and Law |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | http://www.rmit.edu.au/help/disclaimer, Copyright Michaela Rankin |
Page generated in 0.0019 seconds