With the possibility of imitation, we discuss the pricing strategy of an inventor and the piracy-deterrence policy of a government. When inventor and imitator have asymmetric manufacturing costs, piracy may not be deterred by the government. When the inventor¡¦s cost of production is low enough, the inventor always stays in the market and the piracy only occurs if the social welfare is enhanced by the competition. When the inventor¡¦s cost of production is high, a monopoly market emerges and the identity of the monopolist, which can be the inventor or the imitator, is determined by the government through the piracy-deterrence policy such that the social welfare is maximized.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0904112-102042 |
| Date | 04 September 2012 |
| Creators | Chung, Shih-Chieh |
| Contributors | Chun-Chieh Wang, Yung-Nian Tung, Shul-John Li |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0904112-102042 |
| Rights | unrestricted, Copyright information available at source archive |
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