To which extent can local governments in a federal state, which compete with each other, gain some latitude of discretion to draw some additional grants from the common pool of federal funds. How must a federal transfer scheme be designed that tackles common pool fishing and at the same time fulfills the allocative and distributive objectives of the federal government?
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa.de:bsz:ch1-201000361 |
Date | 10 April 2010 |
Creators | Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin |
Contributors | TU Chemnitz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Prof. Dr. Thomas Kuhn, Prof. Dr. Thomas Kuhn, Prof. Dr. Klaus Dieter John, Prof. Dr. Michael Rauscher |
Publisher | Universitätsbibliothek Chemnitz |
Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | doc-type:doctoralThesis |
Format | application/pdf, text/plain, application/zip |
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