This dissertation addresses three topics on applied microeconomics. First, we investigate issues of market power and tax incidence in the U.S. brewing industry. Since alcohol consumption can be addictive, we derive a structural econometric model of addiction from a dynamic oligopoly game. This model identifies the degree of market power in a dynamic setting and allows us to test the hypothesis that federal tax incidence differs from state excise tax. Results indicate that beer producers have a modest market power and an increase in federal excise tax is more effective to reduce consumption than state excise taxes. Second, we estimate the effect of sulfur dioxide (S0���) emissions regulations on the productivity growth and opportunity cost of 261 phase I generating units. The Clean Air Act Amendment (CAAA) of 1990 required units to reduce emissions to 2.5 pounds per mmBTU fuel input in the phase I period (1995-99). We calculate Luenberger productivity indicators using directional technology distance function for 209 units in 1990-1999. There is more potential to reduce pure technical inefficiency since it is the main source of inefficiency in phase I period. Productivity declined, hut it i not significantly different from the productivity growth of pre-phase I. So environmental policy is successful to reduce SO��� emission without sacrificing productivity growth. Opportunity cost declined, but the opportunity cost of scrubber and "other" strategy increase. Third, we estimate the regulatory effect on strategy choice of 257 phase I units using multinomial logit model. We assume behavioral cost is a function of shadow input prices, output, SO��� emissions and regulatory variables. Results suggest regulation significantly affect choices. Units located in high-sulfur coal states are more likely to choose scrubber, allowance or "other" strategy through shadow capital price effect. Allowance trade and sales restriction negatively affect allowance, scrubber or fuel switch strategy. Non-private units are more likely to choose allowance strategy while private units are likely to choose less uncertain scrubber and fuel switch. Units subject to stringent local regulation are more likely to choose "other" strategy and scrubber and units with substitution/compensation boilers are more likely to choose allowance and "other" strategies. / Graduation date: 2003
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ORGSU/oai:ir.library.oregonstate.edu:1957/31894 |
| Date | 28 October 2002 |
| Creators | Noh, Dong Woon |
| Contributors | Fare, Rolf, Grosskopf, Shawna |
| Source Sets | Oregon State University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis/Dissertation |
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