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Mental states and psychological explanation.

Pei Kong-ngai. / Thesis submitted in: September 2002. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves i-vi). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter One: --- Introduction / Chapter 1. --- Intentional States and Folk Psychology --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- "Eliminativism, Externalism, and Individualism" --- p.5 / Chapter 3. --- Overview of The Thesis --- p.8 / Chapter Chapter Two: --- Mental States and Externalism / Chapter 1. --- The Distinction between Intrinsic and Relational Properties --- p.11 / Chapter 2. --- Supervenience --- p.14 / Chapter 3. --- Externalism --- p.18 / Chapter 4. --- The Classical Arguments for Semantic Externalism: The Twin Earth Thought Experiments --- p.19 / Chapter 5. --- From Semantic Externalism to Mental Content Externalism --- p.23 / Chapter 6. --- Externalism and Physicalism --- p.26 / Chapter 7. --- The Common Concept Strategy Objection to Externalism --- p.28 / Chapter Chapter Three: --- Stich's Argument for Individualism: The Argument from Below / Chapter 1. --- Stich's Argument for Individualism --- p.34 / Chapter 2. --- Narrow and Wide Behaviour --- p.37 / Chapter 3. --- Refining the Argument --- p.39 / Chapter 4. --- Is Replacement Argument Successful in establishing Individualism? --- p.44 / Chapter 5. --- Fodor's Argument for Premise 2*: Narrow Behaviour and Crazy Causal Mechanisms --- p.46 / Chapter 6. --- Causal vs. Non-Causal (Constitutive) Causal Powers --- p.51 / Chapter 7. --- Conclusion: Stich's Unsuccessful Argument from Below --- p.53 / Chapter Chapter Four: --- Fodor's Argument for Individualism: The Argument from Abo --- p.ve / Chapter 1. --- Fodor's Explanan Argument --- p.56 / Chapter 2. --- A Response to Individualism: Rendering Intentional States Individualistic --- p.65 / Chapter 2.1 --- Fodor's Account of Narrow Content --- p.69 / Chapter 2.2 --- Criticisms of Fodor's Account of Narrow Content --- p.71 / Chapter 3. --- Examining Global Individualism: Fodor's A Priori Argument --- p.74 / Chapter 3.1 --- Counterexamples to Global Individualism --- p.76 / Chapter 3.2 --- Can Global Individualism be Reconciled with Relational Taxonomies? --- p.81 / Chapter 3.3 --- Two Senses of Causal Relevance of External Conditions --- p.83 / Chapter 3.4 --- The Failure of The Argument from Above --- p.89 / Chapter Chapter Five: --- Conclusion --- p.91 / Bibliography --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.vi

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_324404
Date January 2003
ContributorsPei, Kong-ngai., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy.
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageEnglish, Chinese
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography
Formatprint, 94, vi leaves ; 30 cm.
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

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