The core focus of this thesis is the principal-agent problem and its role in the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis. Analysis of key elements of the problem like moral hazard and adverse selection lays foundations for identifying situations, in which conflict of interests led to negative impacts on the economic performance before and during the financial crisis. This work also studies the influence of factors that are often overlooked by theoretical economists but are still tightly connected to the principal-agent problem, like exogenous incentives based on the mechanism of trust. The author also evaluates mechanisms that have been put into place after the financial crisis and which could help lower agency costs. He also sketches out possible venues of future research in this area.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:193739 |
Date | January 2013 |
Creators | Mach, Milan |
Contributors | Žamberský, Pavel, Hnát, Pavel |
Publisher | Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze |
Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
Language | Czech |
Detected Language | English |
Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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