How should we understand the question "Why be moral?" Can we answer this question? If so, how? In this paper I develop an exemplarist theory of practical moral justification; that is, a theory of the justification of the prima facie moral things that we do, not the moral beliefs that we have. I take as my starting point that morality is, essentially, a set of practices in which all persons, in virtue of their being persons, participate. I argue that skillful practitioners of these various practices should be understood as moral authorities, and that the appeal to a moral authority for the purpose of one's justifying one's moral doings is necessarily justified for the appealer whenever she is practicing the same practice as the moral authority. This theory holds that moral authorities, so circumscribed, are Authoritative Exemplars, and as the appeal to their authority is necessarily justified they are able to provide a foundation for practical moral justifications, and thus rebutting the objection that all such justifications will run to regress. Among other things this account allows us to interpret the "Why be moral?" question as a question asking for more than can be had posed from a position of misunderstanding the nature of morality and practical moral justification. We cannot answer the "Why be moral?" question any more than we can answer the "Why be human?" question. / Master of Arts / In moral philosophy, the study of questions and puzzles arising in broadly moral thought, one of the perennial questions is “Why be moral?” Since the time of Plato, various philosophers have given very different answers to this question. These answers range from “It is in your best interests to be moral” to “It would be irrational for you not to be moral” to “If you have to ask then we cannot convince you that you should be moral.” The most recent thought on this question has taken it to be a very important one; a question that must be answered if moral practice is to retain its sense and relevance to our lives. The question, in more precise terms, is taken to be a demand for a justification of the demands that morality places upon us all. Moreover, this demand for <i>justification</i> is taken to require not just some answer, but an answer that <i>any</i> person must accept. In this paper I argue that the question is simply a bad question, because what morality <i>is</i> is not a theoretical system of principles which we may or may not act in accordance with. Morality is something that we <i>do</i>; it is something that we all do and we cannot stop doing it. To justify <i>what we do</i>, I argue that we may appeal to moral authorities which can rightly serve as our exemplars, as moral authorities are those persons who are skilled at doing what we are doing.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/75224 |
| Date | 02 March 2017 |
| Creators | Lindsey, Johnathan Matthew |
| Contributors | Philosophy, Pitt, Joseph C., Parent, Ted, Moehler, Michael |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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