Daniel Butt develops an account of corrective responsibilities borne by beneficiaries of injustice. He defends the consistency model. I criticize the vagueness in this model and present two interpretations of benefit from injustice (BFI) responsibilities: obligation and natural duty. The obligation model falls prey to the involuntariness objection. I defend a natural duties model, discussing how natural duties can be circumstantially perfected into directed duties and showing how the natural duties model avoids the involuntariness objection. I also address objections from structural injustice and demandingness.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:scholarworks.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1201 |
Date | 12 August 2016 |
Creators | Neefus, Suzanne |
Publisher | ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University |
Source Sets | Georgia State University |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Philosophy Theses |
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