Do ceasefires during peace negotiations facilitate reaching a peace agreement in internal armed conflicts? Existing case studies offer diverging arguments and mixed empirical evidence for whether ceasefires should precede or come after the more political settlements. In this regard, I argue that ceasefires facilitate that the combatant parties will reach a political deal by increasing mutual trust, alleviating the impact of two critical uncertainties in the negotiation stage: the uncertainty on whether the other party is willing to reach a negotiated settlement, and the uncertainty on whether the other party has the capacity to control their respective armed forces. Using new data on negotiation processes in internal armed conflicts in Africa, between 1989 and 2013, I examine the effect of having a ceasefire during negotiations on the probability of reaching a negotiated accord, while controlling for the levels of violence during the talks as a crucial conditioning factor, as well as for the presence of peacekeepers, and the intervention of a mediator. The results show that early ceasefires have a significant effect on the conclusion of political agreements at the talks, and that this effect is stronger when the talks are surrounded by decreased or null levels of violence.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-385523 |
| Date | January 2019 |
| Creators | Martínez Lorenzo, Luís |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Page generated in 0.0017 seconds