Blockchain, the technology behind cryptocurrency, enables decentralized and distrustful parties to maintain a unique and consistent transaction history through consensus, without involving a central authority. The decentralization, transparency, and consensus-driven security promised by blockchain are unprecedented and can potentially enable a wide range of new applications that prevail in the decentralized zero-trust model. While blockchain represents a secure-by-design approach to building zero-trust applications, there still exist outstanding security bottlenecks that hinder the technology's wider adoption, represented by the following two challenges: (1) blockchain as a distributed networked system is multi-layered in nature which has complex security implications that are not yet fully understood or addressed; (2) when we use blockchain to construct new applications, especially those previously implemented in the centralized manner, there often lack effective paradigms to customize and augment blockchain's security offerings to realize domain-specific security goals. In this work, we provide answers to the above two challenges in two coordinated efforts.
In the first effort, we target the fundamental security issues caused by blockchain's multi-layered nature and the consumption of external data. Existing analyses on blockchain consensus security overlooked an important cross-layer factor---the heterogeneity of the P2P network's connectivity. We first provide a comprehensive review on notable blockchain consensus protocols and their security properties. Then we focus one class of consensus protocol---the popular Nakamoto consensus---for which we propose a new analytical model from the networking perspective that quantifies the impact of heterogeneous network connectivity on key consensus security metrics, providing insights on the actual "51% attack" threshold (safety) and mining revenue distribution (fairness). The external data truthfulness challenge is another fundamental challenge concerning the decentralized applications running on top of blockchain. The validity of external data is key to the system's operational security but is out of the jurisdiction of blockchain consensus. We propose DecenTruth, a system that combines a data mining technique called truth discovery and Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus to enable decentralized nodes to collectively extract truthful information from data submitted by untrusted external sources.
In the second effort, we harness the security offerings of blockchain's smart contract functionality along with external security tools to enable two domain-specific applications---data usage control and decentralized spectrum access system. First, we use blockchain to tackle a long-standing privacy challenge of data misuse. Individual data owners often lose control on how their data can be used once sharing the data with another party, epitomized by the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal. We propose PrivacyGuard, a security platform that combines blockchain smart contract and hardware trusted execution environment (TEE) to enable individual data owner's fine-grained control over the usage (e.g., which operation, who can use on what condition/price) of their private data. A core technical innovation of PrivacyGuard is the TEE-based execution and result commitment protocol, which extends blockchain's zero-trust security to the off-chain physical domain. Second, we employ blockchain to address the potential security and performance issues facing dynamic spectrum sharing in the 5G or next-G wireless networks. The current spectrum access system (SAS) designated by the FCC follows a centralized server-client service model which is vulnerable to single-point failures of SAS service providers and also lacks an efficient, automated inter-SAS synchronization mechanism. In response, we propose a blockchain-based decentralized SAS architecture dubbed BD-SAS to provide SAS service efficiently to spectrum users and enable automated inter-SAS synchronization, without assuming trust on individual SAS service providers.
We hope this work can provide new insights into blockchain's fundamental security and applicability to new security domains. / Doctor of Philosophy / Blockchain, the technology behind cryptocurrency, enables decentralized and distrustful parties to maintain a unique and consistent transaction history through consensus, without involving a central authority. The decentralization, transparency, and consensus-driven security promised by blockchain are unprecedented and can potentially enable zero-trust applications in a wide range of domains. While blockchain's secure-by-design vision is truly inspiring, there still remain outstanding security challenges that hinder the technology's wider adoption. They originate from the blockchain system's complex multi-layer nature and the lack of effective paradigms to customize blockchain for domain-specific applications. In this work, we provide answers to the above two challenges in two coordinated efforts.
In the first effort, we target the fundamental security issues caused by blockchain's multi-layered nature and the consumption of external data. We first provide a comprehensive review on existing notable consensus protocols and their security issues. Then we propose a new analytical model from a novel networking perspective that quantifies the impact of heterogeneous network connectivity on key consensus security metrics. Then we address the external data truthfulness challenge concerning the decentralized applications running on top of blockchain which consume the real-world data, by proposing DecenTruth, a system that combines data mining and consensus to allow decentralized blockchain nodes to collectively extract truthful information from untrusted external sources.
In the second effort, we harness the security offerings of blockchain's smart contract functionality along with external security tools to enable two domain-specific applications. First, eyeing on our society's data misuse challenge where data owners often lose control on how their data can be used once sharing the data with another party, we propose PrivacyGuard, a security platform that combines blockchain smart contract and hardware security tools to give individual data owner's fine-grained control over the usage over their private data. Second, targeting the lack of a fault-tolerant spectrum access system in the domain of wireless networking, we propose a blockchain-based decentralized spectrum access system dubbed BD-SAS to provide spectrum management service efficiently to users without assuming trust on individual SAS service providers.
We hope this work can provide new insights into blockchain's fundamental security and applicability to new security domains.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/110096 |
| Date | 13 May 2022 |
| Creators | Xiao, Yang |
| Contributors | Electrical and Computer Engineering, Lou, Wenjing, Zhang, Ning, Reed, Jeffrey H., Pereira da Silva, Luiz Antonio, Hou, Yiwei Thomas |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf, application/x-zip-compressed |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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