The phenomenal experience of our visual perception, what it is like to be in that state, is something that we might take for granted. However, looking closer at the neural correlates of visual processing in relation to phenomenal experience we recognize that it is a complex issue. Whether our subjective experience of our visual representation of the world is attached to cognitive functions, like working memory and attention, or whether some sort of richness overflows such functions, is an ongoing debate within cognitive neuroscience. Advocates for overflow argue that phenomenal experience is the result of activity in posterior occipito-temporo-parietal areas and is independent of attention, while those within the non-overflow position mean that for phenomenal awareness to arise activity in higher-level areas like the prefrontal lobe is needed. Finding evidence for unattended visual phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness would support the overflow position since it could indicate phenomenal experience as independent of attention. In addition to this debate, researchers need to keep in mind what methods are being used to measure phenomenal experience, since several biases potentially follow studies using introspective measures. Through this systematic review, a search string provided empirical studies based on fMRI that investigated unconscious and conscious visual processing. The results of this review show little or weak evidence for unattended visual phenomenal consciousness and do not seem to overflow cognitive functions.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:his-22805 |
Date | January 2023 |
Creators | Fogelquist, Jennifer, Nilsdotter Swartswe, Johanna |
Publisher | Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för biovetenskap |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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