This thesis presents frameworks for the optimal strategic production planning of petroleum refineries operating in competition in multiple markets. The game theoretic concept of the Cournot oligopoly is used as the basic competitive model, and the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for the formulated problems, which are reformulated into potential games. Nonlinear programming potential game frameworks are developed for static and dynamic production planning problems, as well for mixed integer nonlinear expansion planning problems in which refiners have access to potential upgrades increasing their competitiveness. This latter model represents a novel problem in game theory as it contains both integer and continuous variables and thus must satisfy both discrete and continuous mathematical definitions of the Nash equilibrium. The concept of the mixed-integer game is introduced to explore this problem and the theoretical properties of the new class of games, for which conditions are identified defining when a class of two-player games will possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies, and conjectures offered regarding the properties of larger problems and the class as a whole. In all examples, petroleum refinery problems are solved to optimality (equilibrium) to illustrate the competitive utility of the mathematical frameworks. The primary benefit of such frameworks is the incorporation of the influence of market supply and demand on refinery profits, resulting in rational driving forces in the underlying production planning problems. These results are used to justify the development of frameworks for enterprise optimization as a means of decision making in competitive industries. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis presents a mathematical framework in which refinery production planning problems are solved to optimal solutions in competing scenarios. Concepts from game theory are used to formulate these competitive problems into mathematical programs under single objective functions which coordinate the interests of the competing refiners. Several different cases are considered presenting refinery planning problems as static and dynamic programs in which decisions are time independent or dependent, respectively. A theoretical development is also presented in the concept of the mixed integer game, a game theoretic problem containing both continuous and discrete valued variables and which must satisfy both continuous and discrete definitions of Nash equilibrium. This latter development is used to examine refinery problems in which individual refiners have access to numerous unit upgrades which can potentially improve performance. The results are used to justify a game theoretic approach to enterprise optimization.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/22067 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | Tominac, Philip A. |
| Contributors | Mahalec, Vladimir, Chemical Engineering |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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