What do we owe to our loved ones? What is the status of these requirements? How do we reconcile them with other requirements? Are we allowed to buy our child an expensive car when that money could save countless strangers overseas? What exactly does morality demand of us? / My thesis defends an account of partiality justified in terms of relationships. I develop the view that relationships are inextricably linked to wellbeing, and I defend the idea that morality must be concerned with our wellbeing. I try to make sense of this account of partiality with the idea that morality carries a requirement of impartiality. If wellbeing is an important part of morally right actions, and if acting in accordance with reasons of partiality (qua relationships) sometimes promotes wellbeing better than impartiality, then some reasons of partiality lead to morally right actions. Minimally, I argue that for why a strictly impartial (or, on the other extreme, a strictly partial) theory does not work. Both reasons (of partiality and impartiality) must be taken into account and carefully calibrated. More ambitiously, I argue for why partiality deserves its own place at the table in normative ethical theorizing. This is not to say that partiality always leads to right action, rather the suggestion is that there are some forms of partiality (found within relationships) which morality requires. / Thesis / Candidate in Philosophy / Some forms of partiality seem clearly wrong, like racial bias or nepotism; in such cases, it is better to consider our reasons to be impartial, which seem to lead to more fairness or equality. Still, there seem to be other forms of partiality which are clearly right, like the love and care a parent has for their child; in these cases, considering our reasons to be impartial seem like (to quote Bernard Williams), “one thought too many.” This thesis tries fit reasons of partiality and reasons of impartiality together, and argues for a view of (moral) partiality grounded in relationships.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/24060 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Choi, Daniel Y.S. |
| Contributors | Igneski, Violetta, Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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