This thesis explores the moral significance of agent beliefs and epistemic states. In particular it will explore the following question: is an agent's moral obligation a function of her actual circumstances, what she believes those circumstances to be, or what her evidence indicates those circumstances are? Three corresponding views are explored and it is argued that each of these views is subject to one of two substantial worries, which are developed in this thesis (i.e. the manipulation worry and the unreasonableness worry).
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-1147 |
| Date | 01 January 2011 |
| Creators | Keenan, Gregory William |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2011 Gregory Keenan |
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