The Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army. The failure of
the army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture.
Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework was
required to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency. Major
organizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals David
Petraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectual
framework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. They challenged institutional military
orthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, they
demonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that
“proved” FM 3-24. This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured the
consensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of the
army’s philosophy of war.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uoregon.edu/oai:scholarsbank.uoregon.edu:1794/12371 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Chastain, William, Chastain, William |
| Contributors | Berk, Gerald |
| Publisher | University of Oregon |
| Source Sets | University of Oregon |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Rights | All Rights Reserved. |
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