Michaela Polányi's Theory of Personal Knowledge (1891-1976) attempts to cope with the objections of the critical period of philosophy in which the ideals of science are set to be objectively unbiased and empirically grounded knowledge. The reason for this is the distrust of the subjectivistly conceived influence of the tradition and authority of the major research ancestors. Polanyi, however, points out that such ideals disregard the important constitutions of the knowledge of personal character, without which knowledge would not be possible. That is why it responds to these objections by trying to rehabilitate them and putting them in proper contexts. It points out the role of personal judgment that makes an intuitive estimation of the fertility of a research project within the given competencies. It highlights the role of the expertise and knowledge, which operate thanks to capturing the researcher in the tradition of the branch. And last but not least, it emphasizes the role of intellectual enthusiasm that helps the creative and original way to solve the problem. However, according to Polanyi, these constituents can perform their role properly only if the researcher establishes close contact with reality within an act he describes as contemplative submersion into the problem. This cognitive act should protect the entire cognitive process from the risk of subjective distortion. Polanyi also discovers two dimensions of knowledge. The first dimension is called tacit (unspecific). This dimension affects all cognitive processes that take place outside the apparent focal awareness of the cognitive person, yet they essentially influence the understanding of the ability to integrate in the mind of the cognitive person not only the individual elements of knowledge but also their interrelations. It helps to estimate the limits and possibilities of research. The second dimension is fiduciary-programmed knowledge, which points out that all knowledge is based on the commitment of faith to the reality of the cognitive object, to personal abilities of the cognitive person, and to the research community, and the principles of its research. It turns out that faith is not an obstacle to scientific knowledge, but a prerequisite for discovery. That is why Polanyi's theory of human knowledge is also considered in the field of the defense of the relevance of religious epistemology. Polanyi does not make the distinction between secular and religious epistemology as critics of religion. Both types of knowledge, according to him, are constituted by the same cognitive abilities that are applied in the same reality. The difference lies more in a different perspective and in the subject of interest. This thesis focuses on selected chapters of religious epistemology, where the original objections and proposals for their resolving solutions are well evident. These are, above all, the possibilities and limits of God's experience of knowledge, the role of reason and belief, and the possibilities of personal realization of knowledge within the religious tradition and the Authority Church.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:387590 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | KRÁL, Tomáš František |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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