What does it mean for something to be rational? In deciding whether a belief, action, or desire can be considered rational, philosophers have always ran into the ambiguity between the normative and descriptive uses of the term. For instance, to claim that a belief in God is rational could mean that the belief came through some process of argumentation, or it could mean that this is a good belief for someone to have. Similarly, to say that a desire for wealth and fame is irrational might mean that no process of argument brought it about; or it might simply mean that it is not a good desire to have. This kind of ambiguity is related not only to the fact-value problem, but to the classical distinction between theory and practice. / Upon careful scrutiny, however, of all the processes involved in making judgments or holding beliefs, that is, inference and the experience upon which it is based, reasoning and the various shapes in which it is found, and reflective as well as nonreflective use of rules serve to establish a continuity between facts and values. At the same time, such a critical scrutiny indicates the real distinction between 'is,' as signifying what is the case, and 'ought,' as signifying what should be the case. / In performing such a scrutiny, I was forced to perform a double task: first, to develop a set of categorical terms for normative and descriptive rationality; and second (more importantly), to show the relation between ordinary and technical reasoning, thereby inviting philosophy, and theory in general, to assume its established role in the world of practical affairs. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 51-01, Section: A, page: 0185. / Major Professor: Eugene F. Kaelin. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1989.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_78150 |
| Contributors | Santas, Aristotelis., Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text |
| Format | 172 p. |
| Rights | On campus use only. |
| Relation | Dissertation Abstracts International |
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