In this dissertation I seek to overthrow the most sacred dogma in the philosophy of mind: the doctrine that the mind is multiply realizable. Ever since Hilary Putnam introduced Turing machine functionalism, the idea that the mind is multiply realizable has gone unquestioned, and a form of the multiple realizability thesis now permeates the thinking of most functionalists. Nevertheless, I argue, this thesis is mistaken. And precisely because (radical) multiple realizability is the main obstacle of a psychophysical reduction of the mind, by undermining the multiple realizability thesis I open the way for such a reduction to take place. I argue further, however, that analog computationalism is the only form of computationalism that is compatible with psychoneural reduction. I then describe the salient properties of analog computers and explore the implications of these properties for psychoneural reduction.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/289129 |
| Date | January 1998 |
| Creators | King, Michael, 1966-1998 |
| Contributors | Cummins, Robert |
| Publisher | The University of Arizona. |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) |
| Rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. |
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