In this thesis I explore and defend physicalism—the view that there is ‘nothing over and above’ the physical. Part of the challenge for physicalists is to make this slogan precise. They should provide a plausible account of the relation that everything must stand in to the physical in order for nothing to be ‘over and above’ it, as well as a reasonable characterization of ‘the physical’ itself. I elaborate and defend a common physicalist understanding of the ‘nothing over and above’ relation in terms of ‘global metaphysical supervenience,’ and introduce a novel strategy for characterizing the physical that sidesteps the most powerful objection to a ‘future physics’ definition of the physical—what Jessica Wilson (2006) has dubbed ‘the inappropriate extension worry.’ I then explore and respond to David Chalmers’ (1996) ‘zombie argument’ against physicalism, and Ned Block’s (2007) ‘overflow’ argument against the physicalist view of consciousness which I favour.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:OGU.10214/5312 |
| Date | 14 January 2013 |
| Creators | Stevens, Christian |
| Contributors | Bailey, Andrew |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds