This paper analyzes the effect that different designs in the access to fnancial transmission rights has on spot electricity auctions. In particular, I characterize the
equilibrium in the spot electricity market when financial transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator and when financial transmission rights are assigned to
the firm that submits the lowest bid in the spot electricity auction. When financial
transmission rights are assigned to the grid operator, my model, in contrast with the
models available in the literature, works out the equilibrium for any transmission
capacity. Moreover, I have found that an increase in transmission capacity not only
increases competition between markets but also within a single market. When financial transmission rights are assigned to the firm that submits the lowest bid in the
spot electricity auction, firms compete not only for electricity demand, but also for
transmission rights and the arbitrage profits derived from its hold. I have found that
introduce competition for transmission rights reduces competition in spot electricity
auctions.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:unibo.it/oai:amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it:6319 |
| Date | 04 June 2014 |
| Creators | Blazquez de Paz, Mario <1979> |
| Contributors | Calzolari, Giacomo, Tarantino, Emanuele |
| Publisher | Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna |
| Source Sets | Università di Bologna |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Thesis, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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