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Experimental Essays on Social and Agency Dilemmas

Economic research frequently uses experimental methods to study, in the laboratory or in the field, behaviour of economic agents.

The advantage of the laboratory experimental method is the collection of data which is, in some cases, otherwise impossible to obtain. In addition, experiments permit to test, ceteris paribus, the impact of a certain treatment on the behaviour of the economic agents.

These are the reasons for the application of laboratory experimental methods in the three essays of this thesis; which are focused on possible measures for rising compliant behaviour in social and agency dilemmas. Tax compliance has been selected for two essays on social dilemma, while asset management has been chosen for one essay on agency dilemma.

In the tax compliance context, we refer to a compliant behaviour when subjects do not engage tax evasion: the support of compliance has been studied through non monetary (dis)incentives (Chapter 2) and through direct participation of taxpayers in the tax system (Chapter 3).

In the asset management context (Chapter 4), we refer to a compliant behaviour when a fund manager, managing her clients's money, follows the client's disposition even if this implies a payoff reduction for the manager herself. Accountability and monetary punishment are the measures studied in order to reduce opportunistic behaviour of managers and rise their compliance.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:unitn.it/oai:iris.unitn.it:11572/368554
Date January 2014
CreatorsCasal, Sandro
ContributorsCasal, Sandro, Mittone, Luigi
PublisherUniversità degli studi di Trento
Source SetsUniversità di Trento
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Relationfirstpage:1, lastpage:115, numberofpages:115

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