Return to search

Political Business Cycles and the Independence Index of Central Banks

This article will verify whether the central banks create political business cycles or not. To refer to the Opportunistic Model operated by Leetouwer and Maier (2002), this research will expand the acquisition time of data till the fourth season of 2008, and added Korea¡BMalaysia and Taiwan into the model. In this article, the independent variables will be the rates announced by central banks of these ten countries. The dependent variables will be the date of president/parliamentary elections and the independence of central bank to verify before the elections whether will the central banks create political business cycles through setting lower rate in monetary policy are pressured by rules or not.
The empirical results show that: 1.The assumption of Central banks will use interest rates to create a political business cycle does not hold. This complements with Leetouwer and Maier¡¦s results studied in 2002, the interest rate cannot be used as a tool to create political business cycle. 2. The higher independence of central bank, the interest rate introduced by central bank will be lower, and as well as the inflation rate.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0907110-023114
Date07 September 2010
CreatorsChen, Jing-wen
ContributorsWu Chi Cheng, Yung-hsiang Ying, Tung, Yung-nian, Weng, Jia-Hsi
PublisherNSYSU
Source SetsNSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive
LanguageCholon
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0907110-023114
Rightscampus_withheld, Copyright information available at source archive

Page generated in 0.0019 seconds