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Efficient Side-channel Resistant MPC-based Software Implementation of the AES

Current cryptographic algorithms pose high standards of security yet they are susceptible to side-channel analysis (SCA). When it comes to implementation, the hardness of cryptography dangles on the weak link of side-channel information leakage. The widely adopted AES encryption algorithm, and others, can be easily broken when they are implemented without any resistance to SCA. This work applies state of the art techniques, namely Secret Sharing and Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), on AES-128 encryption as a countermeasure to those attacks. This embedded C implementation explores multiple time-memory trade-offs for the design of its fundamental components, SMC and field arithmetic, to meet a variety of execution and storage demands. The performance and leakage assessment of this implementation for an ARM based micro-controller demonstrate the capabilities of masking schemes and prove their feasibility on embedded software.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:wpi.edu/oai:digitalcommons.wpi.edu:etd-theses-1402
Date27 April 2017
CreatorsFernandez Rubio, Abraham
ContributorsYehia Massoud, Department Head, Thomas Eisenbarth, Advisor, Xinming Huang, Committee Member
PublisherDigital WPI
Source SetsWorcester Polytechnic Institute
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceMasters Theses (All Theses, All Years)

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