Can practical factors influence a subject's position to know? Traditionally this question has been answered in the negative. A subject's position to know proposition p is not thought to improve merely because the subject wants to know p or has certain practical stakes depend on whether p. Appealing to these wants and practical interests while defending a claim to know is thought to be epistemically inappropriate.
We argue, to the contrary, that practical factors can influence (i.e. encroach upon) a subject's position to know and can do so in an epistemically appropriate way. The argument we provide is relatively straightforward. We claim that knowledge of a certain set of propositions requires a prior action taken on behalf of the subject. This prior action can be influenced by practical factors and thus practical factors can influence a subject's position to know. Furthermore, we argue that such a move can be epistemically appropriate if it arises in an instance when the evidence and arguments favoring belief -- at least from the subject's own point of view -- are inconclusive. We conclude with an argument that the provided account offers a new framework to defend moral encroachment.
The prior action taken on behalf of a subject, when it is both practically influenced and is epistemically appropriate, can be interpreted as a moral action.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:WATERLOO/oai:uwspace.uwaterloo.ca:10012/6379 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Haydon, Nathan |
| Source Sets | University of Waterloo Electronic Theses Repository |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
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