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Previous issue date: 2013-06-14 / This paper presents a dynamic model of price competition that incorporates both switching and search costs and where the consumer's and rms' decisions are simultaneous. Given the assumptions made we see that this model has an equilibrium. The main properties of the equilibrium of the model are: If search costs are low enough in equilibrium consumer will search all rms in the market while increasing search costs will decrease the proportion of rms being searched. A counterintuitive result is that the expected prices paid by the consumer usually decrease in our numerical computations of equilibrium when search costs increase. While increasing switching costs will also produce the counterintuitive result that unmatched rms will decrease their price o ers in order to attract the consumer. / Esse artigo apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição em precos que incorpora tanto custos de procura quanto custos de switching e onde que as decisões do consumidor e das firmas são simultâneas. Dadas as hipóteses feitas n ós veremos que este modelo possui equilí brio. As principais propriedades do equil íbrio deste modelo são: Se os custos de procura forem baixos o suficiente, em equilí brio o consumidor vai procurar todas as firmas no mercado enquanto que o aumento dos custos de procura vai reduzir a propor cão de firmas que o consumidor busca. Um resultado contraintuitivo e que os pre cos esperados pagos pelo consumidor normalmente decresce em nossas computa cões numéricas do equil íbrio quando os custos de procura aumentam. Enquanto que aumentar os custos de switching tamb ém vai produzir o resultado contraituitivo que as firmas unmatched vão diminuir suas ofertas de modo a atrair o consumidor.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/10960 |
| Date | 14 June 2013 |
| Creators | Guthmann, Rafael Roos |
| Contributors | Monteiro, P. K., Ledo, Bruno Cesar Aurichio, Escolas::EPGE, FGV, Braido, Luís H. B. |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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