For Hegel, serious, painful disagreement among reasonable individuals is part of the very fabric of our intellectual, moral, and social lives. Disagreement about what matters cannot be eliminated. Traditionally, this kind of interpretation is thought to be incompatible with Hegel’s epistemic and metaphysical ambitions: that reason has absolute power to explain all there is, leaving no significant question without an adequate answer. But if genuine disagreement cannot be eliminated, then at least some significant practical normative questions must remain without fully adequate answers. I develop a novel strategy for reconciling these two fundamental aspects of his approach to practical norms and values in his Philosophy of Right. Through what I call topographic explanations, Hegel takes on the task of explaining why the world is structured in such a way that (a) some significant questions necessarily remain open to painful disagreement, and that (b) the world remains a worthy home for our deepest aspirations.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/d8-b2m2-5210 |
| Date | January 2019 |
| Creators | Blili-Hamelin, Borhane |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
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