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A Defense of Moral Realism

This thesis will explain in detail two closely related but jointly defensible moral realist positions. I show how each position responds to the initial dilemma of whether moral judgments are propositions. Following this discussion, I defend this combined position against an objection that the position is inherently contradictory. I conclude that one can coherently maintain both positions without a contradiction.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:digitalarchive.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1008
Date31 July 2006
CreatorsLesandrini, Jason
PublisherDigital Archive @ GSU
Source SetsGeorgia State University
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourcePhilosophy Theses

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