The investigatory findings of the Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia accident investigation boards are analyzed and evaluated relative to one another, with the goal of determining if there are lessons applicable to organizations that manage technically complex programs. An analysis is conducted of the recommendations from the Challenger investigation and NASA's actions taken to correct problems in the organization. The effectiveness of both the recommendations and NASA's response in terms of preventing the Columbia accident are examined. In the intervening years between the Challenger and Columbia several unofficial analyses of the Challenger accident and investigation have been published. The findings of these independent works are presented in order to determine any relationship to the Columbia accident and the subsequent Columbia investigation. The investigation of the Columbia accident and Challenger accident are compared to determine if any of the investigatory findings indicate that there were common factors in the accidents. An evaluation of the NASA organizational structure and culture is conducted. The impact of the culture on implementing the changes recommended after Challenger and relationship to the Columbia accident and investigation is examined. These analyses and examinations result in several conclusions and recommendations applicable to organizations that manage technically complex programs.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nps.edu/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/2580 |
| Date | 09 1900 |
| Creators | Moyer, Seth A. |
| Contributors | Eaton, Donald, Patton, John, Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)., Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP) |
| Publisher | Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School |
| Source Sets | Naval Postgraduate School |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | xiv, 127 p. : ill. ;, application/pdf |
| Rights | Approved for public release, distribution unlimited |
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