Russellian panpsychism is often regarded as a theory of mind that bears promise of integrating conscious experience into the physical causal order. In a recent article by Howell, this is questioned. I will argue that failure to address Howell´s challenge properly has deeper consequences than it might initially appear; epiphenomenal micro-qualia means that we have lost a unique opportunity to gain insight into necessities in nature. In order to make use of this opportunity, however, some initial assumptions commonly made must be dropped: most crucially, the assumption of mind-body distinctness. In what follows, I try to provide a sketch of how a slightly different version of Russellian panpsychism can be formulated that builds around identity instead of mind-body distinctness. This version of panpsychism can meet Howell's challenge, but what is more, it can be met in a way that fully makes use of the special place occupied by panpsychism regarding the mysterious nature of the “necessary connection” between cause and effect.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-226541 |
Date | January 2024 |
Creators | Gahan, Emma |
Publisher | Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier |
Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
Format | application/pdf |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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