Yes / This study provides new evidence that the performance of issuing firms varies by issue type, based on survival analysis methods. Our non-parametric results show that firms raising capital through rights issues, and notably through cash offers, experience a greater risk of delisting following issuance, as compared to those issuing convertible bonds. Our Cox model analyses demonstrate that plain equity issues, in contrast to convertible issues, are subject to different degrees of regulatory discipline, obligations and incentives in shaping survival trajectory. Further, high ownership concentration, agency issues intrinsic to equity offerings, weak shareholders' protection, and corporate ownership and governance and corporate control development at the time of an offer markedly influence post-issue survival. Plain equity issues, notably cash offers, are strongly linked with the agency costs of free cash flows. A large and truly independent board, allied to a separation of CEO and chairman powers, acts as a primary restraint on managers' self-interested behaviour. Such a cohesive governance mechanism can restrain rent-seeking in the firm's fundraising initiative. These observations hold when we take into account information available before an issue, at the time of an issue, and after an issue, demonstrating the robustness of our findings.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:BRADFORD/oai:bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:10454/16573 |
| Date | 2018 August 1923 |
| Creators | Zhang, D., Wu, Yuliang, Ye, Q., Liu, J. |
| Source Sets | Bradford Scholars |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, Accepted manuscript |
| Rights | © 2018 Elsevier. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. |
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