Departing from Fred Dretske’s groundbreaking article, this essay explore the epistemic closure principle: the principle that states that knowledge is closed under known implication. It also explores the relationship to skepticism, various attempts to challenge and defend the principle, as well as developing a new perspective where the skeptical premise is seen as an a priori justified tautology that can be overriden by a posteriori experience. I argue that Dretske’s illuminating example makes it clear that there is an unescapable choice between either rejecting a skeptical premise however intuitive it may seem or inextricably having to admit a skeptical conclusion.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:umu-52691 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Lindner, Philip |
| Publisher | Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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