In "How to Collaborate," Paul Thagard tries to explain why there is so much collaboration in science, and so little collaboration in philosophy, by giving an epistemic cost-benefit analysis. In this paper, I argue that an adequate explanation requires a more fully developed epistemic value theory than Thagard utilizes. In addition, I offer an alternative to Thagard's explanation of the lack of collaboration in philosophy. He appeals to its lack of a tradition of collaboration and to the a priori nature of much philosophical research. I claim that philosophers rarely collaborate simply because they can usually get the benefits without paying the costs of actually collaborating.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/105562 |
| Date | January 2006 |
| Creators | Fallis, Don |
| Contributors | Tollefsen, Deborah, Henderson, David |
| Publisher | University of Memphis |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated) |
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