We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group--and sometimes even the group itself--to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/106289 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Fallis, Don |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated) |
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