The relationship between private and public enforcement of cartel law has been heavily discussed in the recent years, both in legal doctrine and political circles. The European Commission has come up with various initiatives in order to promote and support changes in the legal orders of the EU Member States, which would make the private enforcement of cartel law easier and more accessible, especially for consumers, but for other subjects impaired by the violation of competition rules as well. However, this effort needs to be balanced with the existing system of public enforcement, notably with the established and well-funcioning leniency programmes. A strenghtened "private pillar" must not cause any damage to the exisitng "public pillar". Can private enforcement be an efficient complement to the hitherto system (predominantly public), and if so, where are the limits of it? On one hand, the support of private enforcement could discourage cartelists to participate in the leniency programmes, because the possible economic benefits (exemption from fines) might not outweigh the losses (huge amounts paid on damages in connection with follow-on actions). On the other hand, it has been argued that private enforcement is deeply underdeveloped in the European Union and no ideas of the European Commission drawing...
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:313637 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Kocí, Miloš |
| Contributors | Zemánek, Jiří, Šmejkal, Václav |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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