Traditionally, the corporate governance scholarship has emphasized heavily the "dispersed shareholder regimes" in the United States and the United Kingdom, although "controlling shareholder regimes" constitute the vast majority of the world's economy. Since there have been few systematic studies concerning controlling shareholder regimes (in particular, controlling shareholder regimes in developing countries), they have remained in a black box. With this concern in mind, in this dissertation, I proposed various analytical frameworks for understanding the corporate governance of controlling shareholder regimes that, improperly, have been overlooked for a long time. In the first chapter of my dissertation, entitled Reenvisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, I proposed theories to explain why controlling shareholders and minority shareholders "voluntarily" embrace each other in an emerging capital market while the legal system in that jurisdiction does not require controllers to protect investors. In the second chapter, entitled Controlling Shareholders - "Roving" v. "Stationary," I explored two types of controlling shareholders (i.e., "roving" and "stationary" controllers) and delved into why an economy with stationary controllers is better in terms of corporate governance and more likely to be prosperous than an economy with roving controllers. In the third chapter, entitled Transplanting a Poison Pill to a Controlling Shareholder Regime, I analyzed how a poison pill would affect the market for corporate control and the corporate governance of controlling shareholder regimes. In this dissertation, I have proposed many unconventional analyses and views on controlling shareholder regimes (in some cases, the concepts may be counterintuitive from the perspective of the conventional corporate governance scholarship). I hope that my research will guide scholars in a theoretical way to understand the various aspects of law and economics related to corporate governance that mostly have not been recognized or that have been misunderstood in the standard scholarly studies of corporate governance.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D80Z798N |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Kang, Sang Yop |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
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