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The Chang of China's Naval Strategy

In 1985, China¡¦s highest military policy body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), reached a major decision. This decision required the People¡¦s Liberation Army (PLA) to make a strategic transition from preparing for ¡§early, total, and nuclear war¡¨ to ¡§peacetime army building¡¨ with an eye towards preparing for local, limited wars. While former implies an ideology-driven, imminent and major continental war where a massive Soviet invasion from the north would be dealt with, the latter refers to the limited armed conflicts that may arise from the issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, disputes over economic resources, and securing of major manufacturing platforms and trade-related transportation routes.
To the extent many of such issues, disputes, platforms, and routes are associated with China¡¦s costal and maritime regions, the PLA Navy (PLAN) in China¡¦s defense posture has become more pronounced. Subsequently, a substantial body of PLA literature has emerged to redefined the functions, warfare, arms, and organization of the PLAN.
This dissertation examines the content of such literature and its actual behavior, especially in the third-wave war era.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0709107-103741
Date09 July 2007
CreatorsChang, Shu-cheng
Contributorsnone, wen-cheng Lin, none, none, none
PublisherNSYSU
Source SetsNSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive
LanguageCholon
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0709107-103741
Rightsnot_available, Copyright information available at source archive

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