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No Metaphysics within Physics?

This dissertation has three parts. In "Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience," I defend David Lewis's metaphysical doctrine of Humean supervenience, and traditional metaphysical reductionism more generally, against an alleged holistic threat encapsulated in the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, realism about quantum mechanics is compatible with Humean reductionism. / Philosophy

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:harvard.edu/oai:dash.harvard.edu:1/12274561
Date January 2014
CreatorsMiller, Elizabeth Louise
ContributorsHall, Ned
PublisherHarvard University
Source SetsHarvard University
Languageen_US
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis or Dissertation
Rightsclosed access

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