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Key Randomization Countermeasures to Power Analysis Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems

It is essential to secure the implementation of cryptosystems in
embedded devices agains side-channel attacks. Namely, in order to
resist differential (DPA) attacks, randomization techniques should be
employed to decorrelate the data processed by the device from
secret key parts resulting in the value of this data. Among the
countermeasures that appeared in the literature were those that
resulted in a random representation of the key known as the binary
signed digit representation (BSD). We have discovered some interesting
properties related to the number of possible BSD representations for
an integer and we have proposed a different randomization
algorithm. We have also carried our study to the $\tau$-adic
representation of integers which is employed in elliptic curve
cryptosystems (ECCs) using Koblitz curves. We have then dealt with
another randomization countermeasure which is based on randomly
splitting the key. We have investigated the secure employment of this
countermeasure in the context of ECCs.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:OWTU.10012/2772
Date04 1900
CreatorsEbeid, Nevine Maurice
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis or Dissertation
Format1642177 bytes, application/pdf

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