This dissertation uncovers the underlying structure of inter-organizational information sharing in the public sector from three different theoretical perspectives. Drawing on theories in social networks, policy networks and public management, this study answers the following questions: 1) why are city governments more likely to share information with one another when they belong to the same county? 2) when do local governments share information with one another under a competitive environment? 3) what motivational bases exist for public managers to willingly learn from other governments’ experiences, which, in turn, will lead to more frequent information sharing between governments. To answer the first question, one chapter explores why and when county jurisdiction helps city governments overcome the collective action dilemma in inter-governmental information sharing based on the insight of the ‘strength of strong ties’ hypothesis that ‘people help their friends first, acquaintances later (chum strategy)’. Using exponential random graph model (ERGM), the analysis of economic development information (EDI) sharing patterns among 34 cities in the Orlando metropolitan area confirms that EDI sharing between strong-tied municipal governments, ones sharing the same county jurisdiction, is more likely to take place under two specific conditions: 1) when cities are expected to get more collective demand for the information from others and 2) when they have greater demand for the information. This finding suggests that county jurisdiction boundary functions as a barrier in the exchange of EDI between municipal governments. Regarding the second question, a subsequent chapter investigates how inter-governmental competition affects the tendency of local actors sharing information with one another. Informal policy networks and formal contracts are distinctive governing mechanisms for addressing collaboration risks. Institutional collective action (ICA) theory suggests that a formal contract will be preferred over an informal policy network in inter-governmental relationships, as partner’s defection risk increases under a competitive environment. This paper builds on and extends this proposition by advancing and testing a more complete explanation for local government’s preference of one mechanism over another and investigating how it varies depending on the level of competition in each dyadic local government relationship. This is demonstrated through the development of a substantive measurement strategy for dyadic economic development competition between governments, as well as the assessment of the validity and reliability of the measure. Estimation of QAP network regressions reveals that local governments prefer a formal contract over an informal policy network with their partners when the competition between them increases. However, competition does not necessarily reduce the use of informal policy networks between local actors but rather results in more frequent informal networks between them. The conclusion discusses the practical implications of the findings for government managers and how the measurement approach advanced in this study can be applied to studies of inter-governmental relations in other policy arenas. Lastly, this dissertation additionally explores how public service motivation (PSM) is associated with government officials’ willingness to learn from other governments’ practices drawing on the debates of public sector benchmarking and PSM theory. Benchmarking between local governments has become an important topic in public administration. In benchmarking practice, local government officials play important roles in deciding what they learn, who they learn from and how to adopt and adapt to the lessons. However, less attention has been paid to why local government officials to willingly take lessons from their peer governments. Focusing on a particular type of motivational basis, public service motivation (PSM), this study assesses how PSM and its four dimensions are associated with local government officials’ willingness to learn from other governments’ practices. / A Dissertation submitted to the Askew School of Public Administration and Policy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / 2019 / August 27, 2019. / County Jurisdiction, Information Sharing, Intergovernmental Competition, PSM, Public Sector / Includes bibliographical references. / Richard C. Feiock, Professor Directing Dissertation; Robert Mark Isaac, University Representative; Frances Stokes Berry, Committee Member; Ralph S. Brower, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_752437 |
| Contributors | Ki, Namhoon (author), Feiock, Richard C. (professor directing dissertation), Isaac, R. Mark (Robert Mark), 1954- (university representative), Berry, Frances Stokes (committee member), Brower, Ralph S. (committee member), Florida State University (degree granting institution), College of Social Sciences and Public Policy (degree granting college), Askew School of Public Administration and Policy (degree granting departmentdgg) |
| Publisher | Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text, doctoral thesis |
| Format | 1 online resource (127 pages), computer, application/pdf |
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