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The rejection of three kinds of internalism.

Luk Ching Kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-134). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Internalism and Externalism --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- An Internalist's Tale and the Theme of this Thesis --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Varieties of Internalism and Externalism --- p.2 / Chapter A. --- Varieties of internalism --- p.3 / Chapter B. --- Varieties of Externalism --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Nature of Internalism-Externalism Debate --- p.8 / Chapter 1.4 --- Looking Forward --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Rejection of Humean Internalism --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- Humean Internalism and the Humean conception of Normative Reasons --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- Hume's Theory on the Role of Reason and the Justification of Normative Reasons --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3 --- "Williams's Attack on Desire-independent Normative Reasons, Two Arguments for Williams and Their Weaknesses" --- p.22 / Chapter 2.4 --- Two Anti-Humean Arguments on the Justification of Normative Reasons --- p.30 / Chapter A. --- Nagel on Desires and the Justifications of Normative Reasons --- p.30 / Chapter B. --- Scanlon on the Role of Desires in the Justification of Normative Reasons and My Modifications --- p.34 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Strength of Desires and the Mechanism of Decision Making in the Humean and Anti-Humean models --- p.42 / Chapter 2.6 --- The Rejection of Humean Internalism and a Remark --- p.45 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism --- p.48 / Chapter 3.1 --- PAI and the Nagelian Motivation Theory --- p.49 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Humean Motivation Theory and the Assessment of the Nagelian Motivation Theory --- p.52 / Chapter 3.3 --- Argument for the Humean Motivation Theory 一 The Direction of Fit --- p.59 / Chapter A. --- "Brief Analysis of Intentional Action, Willing, Goal, Intention and Motivating Reason" --- p.60 / Chapter B. --- Direction of Fit and the Humean Motivation Theory --- p.62 / Chapter 3.4 --- Four Arguments against the Humean Motivation Theory --- p.64 / Chapter A. --- Special Nature of Moral Beliefs --- p.65 / Chapter B. --- The Non-teleological Nature of Moral Actions --- p.70 / Chapter C. --- Argument of Intellectualized Motivation --- p.73 / Chapter D. --- Argument of Irrationality --- p.78 / Chapter 3.5 --- The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism --- p.84 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.86 / Chapter 4.1 --- Rational Internalism --- p.86 / Chapter 4.2 --- Argument of Incoherence --- p.88 / Chapter A. --- Exposition --- p.88 / Chapter B. --- Criticism --- p.92 / Chapter 4.3 --- Proper-grasp Argument --- p.105 / Chapter 4.4 --- Virtuous Person Argument --- p.110 / Chapter 4.5 --- The Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.117 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- After the Rejection of Rational Internalism --- p.119 / Chapter 5.1 --- Two Problems of Rational Internalism --- p.120 / Chapter 5.2 --- Rejection of Rational Internalism and Appropriateness of Blame --- p.124 / Chapter 5.3 --- Weak Externalism and Morality --- p.129 / Bibliography --- p.132

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_325777
Date January 2006
ContributorsLuk, Ching Kit., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy.
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageEnglish, Chinese
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography
Formatprint, ii, 134 leaves ; 30 cm.
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

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