This dissertation analyzes the men's razor market to examine whether a monopolist can implement price discrimination for the complementary goods. I estimate a demand system for razors using the random coefficient logit model with market level sales data from the Nielsen Store Scanner dataset and individual demographic data from the March CPS. The estimated parameters are used to construct price-cost markups. By comparing the markups of different products, I find evidence that Gillette uses a two-part tariff strategy. This conclusion can be generalized as that of a monopolist setting the prices of tie-in products consistent with a two-part tariff.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uky.edu/oai:uknowledge.uky.edu:economics_etds-1044 |
Date | 01 January 2019 |
Creators | Yang, Zheng |
Publisher | UKnowledge |
Source Sets | University of Kentucky |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Theses and Dissertations--Economics |
Page generated in 0.0015 seconds